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I. INTRODUCTION
In November 2011, U.S. District Court Judge Richard Leon ruled that the U.S.
Food and Drug Administration's (FDA's) proposed graphic health warnings for
cigarette packages violated tobacco companies' First Amendment rights.' In doing
so, he pointedly refused to consider the experiences of Canada, the United Kingdom,
and the more than thirty other countries that had adopted similar graphic warnings in
the past decade. Rather, he swatted away all references to those other countries'
experiences by stating (first at oral argument and then in his decision) that "none of
[those countries] afford First Amendment protections like those found in our
Constitution."2
While it is true that no other country uses the First Amendment per se, many
other countries do offer constitutional protection to freedom of speech and/or
freedom of expression. Indeed, several other countries apply "strikingly similar"
legal tests when reviewing restrictions on speech (and on commercial speech in
particular). Thus, the statement that other countries do not "afford First Amendment
protections like those found in our Constitution" is an oversimplification.5 Rather
t Assistant Professor of Health Policy and Law at Ohio State University's College of Public
Health and Moritz College of Law.
1 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 823 F. Supp. 2d 36 (D.D.C. 2011), aff'd, 696 F.3d 1205
(D.C. Cir. 2012). This decision was affirmed by the appellate court and the FDA elected not to seek
review by the Supreme Court.
2 Id. at 48 n.21 (emphasis added).
See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Chrysanthemum, the Sword, and the First Amendment:
Disentangling Culture, Community, and Freedom of Expression, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 905, 905 (1998).
4 Guy E. Carmi, Dignity Versus Liberty: The Two Western Cultures of Free Speech, 26 B.U.
INT'L L.J. 277, 369 (2008).
s R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 823 F. Supp. 2d at 48 n.21 (emphasis added). Also lost in Judge
Leon's dismissal of the experiences of other countries is that those experiences provide a highly
probative form of evidence. Even if the precise details of legislation are different (e.g., the warnings
labels in other countries are not identical to those proposed by the FDA), the experiences of foreign
countries are still relevant to the First Amendment tests laid down by the Supreme Court. For
example, the Central Hudson test used to review restrictions on commercial speech asks the
government to demonstrate whether the proposed restriction "directly advances the government
interest asserted." Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'r of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
566 (1980). Evidence from other countries' experiences can help to inform this analysis.
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than ignore how other countries have addressed tensions between freedom of
expression and other societal interests (such as public health), a comparative analysis
can help enrich our understanding of the First Amendment by introducing new
perspectives and doctrinal considerations that may challenge our settled
assumptions. 6
Applying a comparative pers ?ective, this Article will focus on the protection
afforded to commercial speech, and to tobacco advertising in particular. For
purposes of this Issue, I will focus solely on the example of Canada. Like the United
States, Canada has a constitutional provision that protects freedom of speech, and in
commercial speech cases it applies a balancing test that is almost identical to the
Central Hudson test used by U.S. courts.8 It is important to emphasize, however, that
the case of Canada is not unique in these respects. Other countries and
jurisdictions-including South Africa, 9 Japan, 10 and the European Union"-also use
Central Hudson-like balancing tests when reviewing restrictions on commercial
speech. Each jurisdiction has come to its own conclusions about how to best balance
commercial speech rights against the challenge of regulating tobacco marketing. My
discussion of Canada's approach is presented here as one example of a broader
comparative analysis that could be undertaken.
Carefully examining how other countries strike the balance between free
expression and public health could lead to a productive reexamination of the First
Amendment's commercial speech doctrine and its purpose. In particular, as the
example of Canada demonstrates, a comparative discussion can help to reintroduce
the interests of the consumer into the debate over commercial expression rights.
From the perspective of the consumer, not all commercial speech is equally
6 Cf Krotoszynski, supra note 3, at 913 (suggesting that "examination of freedom of speech in
Japan leads to a more insightful understanding of our domestic speech rights and a heightened
awareness of the implicit costs and benefits associated with maintaining these rights").
There is no clear definition of "commercial speech." In Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.,
the Supreme Court suggested that following factors should be considered in determining whether
speech is commercial: (1) whether the speech proposes a commercial transaction, (2) whether the
speech references a specific product, and (3) whether the speaker is motivated by economic aims. See
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-76 (1983).
8 See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, §§ 1-2; see
also R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (Can.).
9 See S. AFR. CONST., 1996 §§ 16, 36 (protecting freedom of expression, but allowing for such a
right to be limited under a balancing test taking into account "a. the nature of the right; b. the
importance of the purpose of the limitation; c. the nature and extent of the limitation; d. the relation
between the limitation and its purpose; and e. less restrictive means to achieve the purpose"). These
provisions were recently applied to restrictions on tobacco marketing in British American Tobacco
South Africa Ltd. v. Minister of Health 2012 (3) SA 593 (SCA) (S. Afr.).
'o See Krotoszynski, supra note 3, at 931-33 (discussing Japan's constitutional protection for
freedom of speech and noting that like the U.S. Supreme Court, "the Supreme Court of Japan
routinely has balanced the individual's interest in freedom of expression against other private interests
and public interests").
1 Nearly all countries in Europe are parties to the 1953 European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. See Convention for the Protection ofHuman Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, COuNCIL OF EUR. (Mar. 3, 2013), http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/
Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=005&CM=&DF=&CL=ENG. While not a constitution, the Convention
is binding on all member states, and its provisions are enforced by the European Court of Human
Rights. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4 1950,
E.T.S. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (Nov. 4, 1950), available at http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/treaties/
html/005.htm. The Convention protects freedom of expression, including commercial expression, and
its protections are "similar theoretically and conceptually" to those provided by the First Amendment.
Bruce E.H. Johnson & Kyu Ho Youm, Commercial Speech and Free Expression: The United States
and Europe Compared, 2 J. INT'L MEDIA & ENT. L. 159, 161 (2009).
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valuable, and not all government restrictions on speech infringe upon consumer
autonomy. To the contrary, regulations on speech can protect consumers from the
deceptive and manipulative marketing of harmful products such as tobacco.
II. COMMERCIAL SPEECH & TOBACCO ADVERTISING IN THE UNITED
STATES
To make the comparison with Canada, it is first necessary to quickly review
how the U.S. Supreme Court has approached commercial speech cases. The First
Amendment states, "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press . . . . Although the text is unqualified, suggesting that
freedom of speech can never be restricted, the Supreme Court has developed a
complex set of First Amendment doctrines that apply different levels of protection to
different types of speech. 13 These doctrines-including the commercial speech
doctrine-are non-textual judicial creations whose applications vary over time and
with changes in the Supreme Court's makeup.14
A. THE SUPREME COURT'S COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE
Before the mid-1970s, the Supreme Court did not consider commercial speech
to be protected by the First Amendment at all.' 5 In a series of cases culminating in
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council (1976),
the Supreme Court changed course and decided that the First Amendment's
protections extended to commercial speech. 16 In Virginia Pharmacy, the Court
struck down a Virginia regulation that prohibited pharmacists from advertising the
price of prescription drugs.' 7 In the course of its decision, the Court (in an opinion
by Justice Blackmun) provided three reasons why commercial speech should be
entitled to First Amendment protection.' 8 As summarized by Eric Barendt:
12 U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
1 For instance, even religious and political speech can be subjected to "time, place, and manner"
limitations, so long as such restrictions are content-neutral. See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City v.
Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469 (2009).
14 See Carlos E. Gonzalez, The Logic of Legal Conflict: The Perplexing Combination of
Formalism and Anti-Formalism in Adjudication of Conflicting Legal Norms, 80 OR. L. REV. 447, 468
n.34 (2001).
'5 See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (U.S. 1942) ("We are equally clear that the
Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising.").
1 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
7 Id. at 770 (holding that the state is "free to require whatever professional standards it wishes of
pharmacists" but that "it may not do so by keeping the public in ignorance of the entirely lawful terms
that competing pharmacists are offering").
1" Id. at 764-70.
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The first focused on the interests of consumers in the free flow of
commercial information: "[T]hat interest may be as keen, if not keener
by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent political debate.'
Secondly, society has a strong interest in the unimpeded flow of
commercial information, partly because that information may have a
public interest component, but more generally because the flow is
important in enabling consumers to make informed choices, which
cumulatively are essential to the working of a free-enterprise economy.
Thirdly, for the state to justify its ban on the publication of drug prices
with the argument that otherwise consumers would be attracted to go
to low-cost, low-quality pharmacist is unacceptable paternalism.'
In short, the majority in Virginia Pharmacy reasoned that commercial speech
should be protected because of the interests of the consumer in obtaining
information needed to make decisions, even if those decisions are purely economic
in character.20 (Note that the plaintiff in Virginia Pharmacy was a consumer group
interested in obtaining price-related information, not a pharmacist looking to
distribute such information.) 21
Virginia Pharmacy balanced the consumers' interest in obtaining price-related
information against the state's argument that the regulation was needed to protect the
professionalism of pharmacists. Suggesting that the regulation seemed more like a
protectionist measure meant to ensure higher drug prices than a bona fide measure to
ensure professionalism, the Court ruled that regulation was invalid.22 It left open the
question of how such balancing should be conducted in future cases-an issue that
the Court addressed four years later in Central Hudson.
In Central Hudson, the Court developed a four-pronged test that has been used
for the past twenty-plus years to review restrictions on commercial speech.23 The
Central Hudson test provides:
1. To qualify for First Amendment protection, the commercial speech must
concern lawful activity and not be misleading.24
2. The government's asserted interest in restricting the speech must be
substantial.25
3. The restriction must directly advance the government's asserted
26interest.
4. The restriction must not be more extensive than necessary to serve the
asserted government interest.27
This test is a form of "intermediate scrutiny." 28 It provides some protection to
commercial speech, but is clearly a less rigorous form of review than that afforded to
9 ERIc BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 400-01 (2d. ed. 2005) (footnotes omitted). Justice
Rehnquist dissented from the opinion, objecting to the creation of a new commercial speech doctrine
that "elevates commercial intercourse between a seller hawking his wares and a buyer seeking to
strike a bargain to the same plane as has been previously reserved for the free marketplace of ideas."
Va. State Bd. ofPharmacy, 425 U.S. at 781 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
20 The second and third reasons listed by Justice Blackmun both relate back to the interest in
ensuring that consumers are able to obtain access to information. Id. at 764-70.
21 Id. at 753-54.
22 Id. at 769.
23 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564-66 (1980).24 Id. at 564.
25 Id.
Id. at 566.
27 See id.
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"core" First Amendment speech such as political speech.29 Courts are, in effect,
asked to balance the government's interest in restricting the speech against the
constitutional value of the commercial speech at issue. 30 Although the Central
Hudson test provides a framework for courts to use in reviewing commercial speech
cases, it does not provide any clear guidance as to how the framework is to be
applied in any particular case. Whether a regulation is "more extensive than
necessary," for example, is a context-specific judgment call not amenable to broad
generalizations.3 1
What can be said, however, is that the Court has, over time, been less willing to
defer to a legislature's conclusion that a particular restriction on speech is required.
Though it continues to apply Central Hudson's intermediate standard of review, in
recent years the Court has "continued to strike down commercial speech regulations
under what increasingly has looked like a strict scrutiny standard." 32 A few key
points in the Court's progression towards a more demanding standard of review are
summarized below:
* 1993: In Edenfield v. Fane, the Court appeared to raise the evidentiary
burden placed on the government, writing that the state must show that
the proposed restriction will advance its interest "to a material degree,"
and suggesting that specific studies may be needed to support a
restriction on commercial speech.
* 1996: In 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, the Court rejected the argument
that since the government could completely ban "vice" activities such as
drinking or gambling, it should be able to more freely regulate
commercial speech relating to such activities. 34 Earlier commercial
speech decisions had accepted such an argument.35
* 2002: In a five-to-four ruling in Thompson v. Western States Medical
Center, the Court stated: "[W]e have made clear that if the Government
could achieve its interests in a manner that does not restrict speech, or
that restricts less speech, the Government must do so."3 6 In other words,
it suggested that a restriction on commercial speech must be the last
resort, if non-speech-related options were available.
In its most recent commercial speech case, Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc. (2011),
the Court suggested that "heightened scrutiny" should apply to commercial speech
cases, intimating that the Central Hudson test might be replaced with a more
2 Id. at 573 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (characterizing the four-part test applied by the majority
as a form of intermediate scrutiny).29 See id. at 563 ("The Constitution therefore accords a lesser protection to commercial speech
than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression.").
3o See id. ("The protection available for particular commercial expression turns on the nature
both of the expression and of the governmental interests served by its regulation.").
31 Id. at 566.32 Samantha Rauer, Note, When the First Amendment and Public Health Collide: The Court's
Increasingly Strict Constitutional Scrutiny of Health Regulations that Restrict Commercial Speech, 38
AM. J.L. & MED. 690, 693 (2012).
33 Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 771 (1993) (invalidating limits on the solicitation of business
by accountants).
44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 511-14 (1996) (striking down a Rhode Island
law that limited the advertisement of prices for alcoholic beverages).
35 See Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. ofP.R., 478 U.S. 328, 345-46 (1986) (upholding a
statute limiting advertising for casino gambling in Puerto Rico by concluding that "the greater power
to completely ban casino gambling includes the lesser power to ban advertising of casino gambling").3 Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 371 (2002) (invalidating FDA regulations
restricting the advertising of compounded pharmaceuticals).
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stringent standard. " Ultimately, the Court reaffirmed Central Hudson as the
appropriate test, but wrote, "[T]he State may not seek to remove a popular but
disfavored product from the marketplace by prohibiting truthful, nonmisleading
advertisements that contain impressive endorsements or catchy jingles. That the
State finds expression too persuasive does not permit it to quiet the speech or to
burden its messengers." 38 Although the language of "disfavored product" brings to
mind tobacco,39 it has yet to be seen whether or how the Court will apply this dicta
to the case of tobacco marketing. 40 Already, however, lower courts have cited this
phrase in striking down restrictions on tobacco advertising.41
B. TOBACCO ADVERTISING
The Supreme Court has only decided one case that directly applied the Central
Hudson test in the specific context of limits on tobacco advertising. In that case,
Lorillard v. Reilly, the Supreme Court struck down a Massachusetts regulation
barring outdoor tobacco advertisements within 1000 feet of a school or playground.42
The Court addressed the first two prongs of the Central Hudson test quite
summarily. It noted that Massachusetts had conceded (for purposes of the summary
judgment motion before the Court) that the speech at issue was not misleading or
related to illegal conduct, and that the tobacco companies had conceded that the state
had a significant interest in reducing tobacco use by minors.43 With respect to the
third prong, the Court conducted a more thorough analysis before concluding that
the state regulation would indeed advance the government interest asserted.44 Thus,
the case turned on the Court's analysis of Central Hudson's fourth prong, which
asks "whether the speech restriction is not more extensive than necessary to serve
the interest that support it."4 5
The Court concluded that the prohibition on advertising within 1000 feet of a
school or playground was more extensive than necessary for several reasons. First,
the Court noted that such a restriction would, in some geographical areas, "constitute
nearly a complete ban on the communication of truthful information about
n Sorrell v. I.M.S. Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2664 (2011) (voiding a Vermont law barring
pharmaceutical companies from using pharmacy records showing the prescribing practices of
individual physicians in their marketing efforts).
" Id. at 2671.
39 This is the tobacco companies' preferred language. When referring to tobacco, "deadly" would
be a more appropriate adjective than "disfavored."
40 See Micah Berman, Kathleen Dachille & Julie Ralston Aoki, Sorrell and the Future of
Commercial Speech Regulations, JURIST (Oct. 4, 2011), http://jurist.org/forum/2011/10/berman-
dachille-aoki-sorrell.php (suggesting that Sorrell is distinguishable from tobacco-related cases and
might not signify a significant shift in the way courts addresses advertising restrictions on harmful
products).
41 See, e.g., Nat'l Ass'n of Tobacco Outlets v. City of Worcester, 851 F. Supp. 2d 311, 319 (D.
Mass. 2012) ("Under Sorrell, the City of Worcester may not seek to remove a popular but disfavored
type of products-those products that serve tobacco usage-from the marketplace by prohibiting
truthful, nonmisleading advertisements directed to adults.").
42 Lorillard v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 561-66 (2001). Technically, the decision struck down the
limits with respect to cigarette advertising on other legal grounds. See id. at 550-51 (striking down
Massachusetts's regulation on outdoor and point of sale cigarette advertising on the grounds of federal
preemption). It struck down the limits on cigar and smokeless tobacco advertising on First
Amendment grounds. See id. at 566.
4 Id. at 554.
44 See id. at 558-61 (internal quotation marks omitted).
45 Id. at 556 (quoting Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, I88
(1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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smokeless tobacco and cigars to adult consumers." 46 This was because the
regulations prohibited not only outdoor advertising, such as billboards, but also
indoor advertising that was visible from outside. 47 As the Court noted, retailers
would not even be permitted to communicate to passers-by that tobacco products
were available for sale. 48 Second, it appeared that the Massachusetts Attorney
General had failed to consider the impact of the restriction in major metropolitan
areas and had instead adopted the 1000 foot measure from the FDA's proposed 1996
rule (which has been struck down by the Supreme Court-on grounds unrelated to
the First Amendment-in 2000) without any analysis. 4 9 The failure to consider the
degree to which the restriction might suppress advertising suggested a "lack of
tailoring."5 0 Third, the broad definition included in the restriction-which appeared
to restrict oral, as well as printed, communications-seemed broader than necessary
to achieve the state's interest. 5' Together, all of these factors led the Court to find
that the regulation did not satisfy the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test.52
In my view, Lorillard was a much narrower decision than it is often taken to be.
Taking the Supreme Court at its word, the Massachusetts regulations might have
been upheld if (a) they applied only to outdoor advertising, and not to advertisements
visible from outdoors (and allowed retailers to signal the availability of tobacco
products), (b) they did not include a restriction on oral communication, and (c) the
Massachusetts Attorney General had provided a better justification for selecting the
1000-foot distance. Nonetheless, Lorillard has often been read (or misread) for the
much more general proposition that restrictions on tobacco advertising are
presumptively unconstitutional. While this seems to me to be a gross exaggeration
of Lorillard's holding, it is nonetheless consistent with the direction the courts have
taken on commercial speech issues in the years since Lorillard.54
In sum, although the tobacco-specific case law is not well developed, the U.S.
Supreme Court has been increasingly skeptical of restriction on commercial
speech. 5 The Supreme Court's key commercial speech decisions over the past two
46 Id. at 562.
" See id.
48 See id at 565.
49 See id. at 562-63.
o Id. at 563.
' See id
52 See id. at 565 ("We conclude that the Attorney General has failed to show that the outdoor
advertising regulations for smokeless tobacco and cigars are not more extensive than necessary to
advance the State's substantial interest in preventing underage tobacco use.").
s3 See, e.g., Clay Calvert, Wendy Allen-Brunner & Christina M. Locke, Playing Politics or
Protecting Children? Congressional Action & A First Amendment Analysis of the Family Smoking
Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, 36 J. LEGIS. 201, 205 (2010) (suggesting that the tobacco
advertising restrictions in the Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. I11-31, 123 Stat. 1776 (2009) (to be
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (labeling), 15 U.S.C. § 4402 (smokeless tobacco warning), 21 U.S.C.
§ 387a-1 (final rule)), "seem[] to have been crafted behind a veil of legal ignorance-or, perhaps, a
willful blindness-of Lorillard and pertinent academic scholarship surrounding it"); Michael Hoefges,
Protecting Tobacco Advertising Under the Commercial Speech Doctrine: The Constitutional Impact
of Lorillard Tobacco Co., 8 COMM. L. & POL'Y 267, 305 (2003) (writing that the Lorillard decision
"effectively places tobacco advertising on the same constitutional level as advertising for other lawful
goods and services under the First Amendment" and suggests that restrictions intended to protect
children from tobacco advertising are likely to be invalidated).
54 See generally Rauer, supra note 32.
5s The Supreme Court may agree to review a case challenging the advertising restrictions in the
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act in the coming year. Discount Tobacco City &
Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2012), petitionfor cert. filed sub nom. Am. Snuff
224
COMMERCIAL SPEECH LAW AND TOBACCO MARKETING
decades-44 Liquormart, Western States, and Sorrell-all suggest that it may now
be harder than in the past for restrictions on tobacco advertising to survive the
Court's review.
III. COMMERCIAL SPEECH AND TOBACCO ADVERTISING IN CANADA
As shown below, Canada applies a standard of review in commercial speech
cases that closely parallels the Central Hudson test. Although the Canadian Supreme
Court is not as protective of commercial speech as its U.S. counterpart, it carefully
reviews laws that curtail commercial speech and has not hesitated to strike down
laws it views as unconstitutional restrictions on free expression.56 Twice in the last
two decades, the Canadian Supreme Court has had the opportunity to apply its
commercial speech jurisprudence to restrictions on tobacco advertising.
A. CANADIAN COMMERCIAL SPEECH LAW
Until 1982, Canada did not provide any explicit constitutional protection for
freedom of speech. Thus, all of Canada's free speech jurisprudence (not only its
commercial speech jurisprudence) is of relatively recent vintage. The Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, adopted as part of Canada's Constitution in 1982,
functions as Canada's version of the Bill of Rights. Sections 1 and 2 of the Charter
provide as follows:
1. "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the
rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable
limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free
and democratic society." 59
2. "Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms:
(a) freedom of conscience and religion;
(b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including
freedom of the press and other media of communication;
(c) freedom of peaceful assembly; and
(d) freedom of association.
Section 2(b) is the relevant part of Section 2 for purposes of this discussion, and
unlike the First Amendment it protects "freedom of expression," not just "freedom
of speech." 61 This is not a significant difference, however, as it apparently results
from the drafters' recognition that much of what the First Amendment protects is not
Co., LLC v. United States, No. 12-521 (Oct. 26, 2012). This would give the Court the opportunity to
further clarify its approach to the regulation of tobacco advertising.
56 ROGER A. SHINER, FREEDOM OF COMMERCIAL ExPRESSION 91 (2003) (noting that the
Canadian Supreme Court has, like the U.S. Supreme Court, "struck down numerous . . . provincial
restrictions on professional advertising" and "invalidated restrictions controlling the advertising of,
respectively, alcohol and tobacco").
s7 See id. at 70.
" See id.
5 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule
B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11, § 1 (U.K.).
60 Id. § 2. Note that section 2 covers essentially the same subject matter as the First Amendment
(religion, speech/expression, press, assembly/association).
61 See SHINER, supra note 56, at 71.
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technically "speech" (artistic expression, silent protests, etc.). 62 Another difference is
that Section 1 "explicitly acknowledges ... the possibility of valid limitations on
charter rights and freedoms under certain conditions." 63 The First Amendment, by
contrast, is absolute and does not explicitly provide for any exceptions.64 But as
discussed above, the First Amendment is not absolute in practice, particularly when
it comes to commercial speech. 65 Despite according commercial speech
constitutionally protected status, U.S. courts are required, in effect, to balance
commercial speech interests against the strength of the governmental interests
asserted.66 Section I of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms simply makes
the need to balance competing interests explicit. 67
Section 1 does not, however, give Canadian courts much guidance in
determining how such balancing is to be conducted. The analysis under Section I
was formalized by the 1986 case of R. v. Oakes6 8 (the "Oakes test"), which, as
summarized by Roger Shiner, provides as follows:
1. The objective of the limitation must be sufficiently important to
warrant overriding a constitutionally protected right or freedom.
As a minimum, it must represent a pressing and substantial
concern.
2. The means employed must be reasonable and demonstrably
justified. The assessment of this takes the form of a three-part test
of proportionality:
(i) The measures employed must be rationally connected to the
objective.
(ii) The measures should impair the freedom no more than is
necessary to accomplish the objective.
(iii) The effects of the impugned limit must not be
disproportionate to the legislative objective sought.69
Unlike the Central Hudson test, which applies only to restrictions on
commercial speech, the Oakes test is used to assess infringements on any rights
provided for by the Charter. Notwithstanding that crucial difference, the two tests
are remarkably similar in form, as the Canadian Supreme Court has noted. Part I of
the test requires a finding that a constitutionally protected right is being infringed,
which is analogous to the first prong of the Central Hudson test.7' Part I also
62 See id.
61 See id.
6 See id (contrasting Section 2 with the First Amendment).
65 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
66 See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
67 Although the First Amendment is written in unqualified form while Canada's Constitution
explicitly permits a balancing of competing interests, that distinction likely has little practical effect in
the case of restrictions on commercial speech. Cf Johnson & Youm, supra note 11, at 195-96 ("As the
commercial speech case law of the [U.S.] Supreme Court and the [European Court of Human Rights]
indicates, it makes little difference whether the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech or of the
press is textually qualified or unqualified.").
68 R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (Can.).
69 SHINER, supra note 56, at 71.
7o Ford v. Quebec (Att'y Gen.), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712, 758 (Can.) (writing that the Central Hudson
test is "an attempt to balance the legitimacy of government regulations intended to protect consumers
from harmful commercial speech with the belief that a free market in ideas and information is
necessary to an informed and autonomous consumer").
" See id
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requires a "pressing and substantial" governmental concern, analogous to the second
prong of Central Hudson.72 Part 2(i) demands a rational connection between the
governmental interest and the means pursued. 1 This corresponds to the third prong
of Central Hudson, although "rational connection" may be a somewhat weaker
standard than "directly advances." 74 Finally, Part 2(ii)'s requirement that the
measure "impair the freedom no more than is necessary" is quite similar to the
fourth prong of the Central Hudson test.75 (The final part of the Oakes test, Part
2(iii), does not have a direct correlate in the Central Hudson test.)7 6
It was not until the late 1980s that the Supreme Court of Canada clarified the
constitutional status of commercial speech. In Ford v. Quebec, the court affirmed
that commercial speech was constitutionally protected, writing:
Given the earlier pronouncements of this Court to the effect that the
rights and freedoms guaranteed in the Canadian Charter should be
given a large and liberal interpretation, there is no sound basis on
which commercial expression can be excluded from the protection of
s.2(b) of the Charter . . . . Over and above its intrinsic value as
expression, commercial expression which, as has been pointed out,
protects listeners as well as speakers, plays a significant role in
enabling individuals to make informed economic choices, an important
aspect of individual self-fulfillment and personal autonomy. The Court
accordingly rejects the view that commercial expression serves no
individual or societal value in a free and democratic society and for
this reason is undeserving of any constitutional protection.
Like the U.S. Supreme Court in Virginia Pharmacy, the Canadian Supreme Court
ascribed constitutional value to commercial speech primarily for its role in
promoting consumers' interests in obtaining information and exercising their
autonomy.
Since Ford, the Canadian Supreme Court has consistently held that commercial
speech is within the protection of Section 2(b). 8 In contrast to the U.S. Supreme
Court, however, it does not consider commercial speech as a different category of
speech requiring a separate legal doctrine. 79 Rather, the Oakes test is applied to all
72 Compare Oakes, I S.C.R. at 138-39, with Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980) ("The State must assert a substantial interest to be achieved by
restrictions on commercial speech.").
73 Oakes, I S.C.R. at 139.
74 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566.
7s Compare Oakes, I S.C.R. at 139, with Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566
("[S]peech restrictions [must] be 'narrowly drawn.' The regulatory technique may extend only as far
as the interest it serves.").
76 SHINER, supra note 56, at 72.
n Ford v. Quebec (Att'y Gen.), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712, 766-67 (Can.) (emphasis added). According
to Karla Gower, commercial speech had not been deemed to fall within Canada's protections for
freedom of speech in the pre-Charter era. See Karla K. Gower, Looking Northward: Canada's
Approach to Commercial Expression, 10 CoMM. L. & POL'Y 29, 36 (2005).
7 See generally Gower, supra note 77, at 42-56 (summarizing Ford and its progeny).
7 Id. at 45 (noting the Canadian Supreme Court's rejection of an approach to commercial speech
that would involve defining it as a separate category of speech: "The Canadian Court made it clear
that it did not want to get into the problem of trying to define commercial expression. It chose instead
to take a purposive approach to determining whether the speech in question warranted Charter
protection").
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types of infringements on freedom of expression.80 That being said, Canada does
apply the Oakes test in a context-specific way, giving a lower amount of protection
to commercial speech than to other types of protected expression (e.g., political
speech). 8' As stated by the Canadian Supreme Court in Rocket v. Royal College of
Dental Surgeons:
While the Canadian approach does not apply special tests to
restrictions on commercial expression, our method of analysis does
permit a sensitive, case-oriented approach to the determination of their
constitutionality. Placing the conflicting values in their factual and
social context when performing the s. I analysis permits the courts to
have regard to special features of the expression in question .. .. [N]ot
all expression is equally worthy of protection. Nor are all
infringements of free expression equally serious. 82
In Rocket, the Court suggested that because the case involved commercial
speech-as opposed to political participation or artistic expression-"restrictions on
expression . . . might be easier to justify than other infringements of [Section]
2(b)."8 But at the same time, the Court also recognized that the commercial speech
at issue, which was advertising by dentists, also had value to consumers. 84 The Court
wrote that these two factors must be weighed against one another, and in this case, it
held that the restrictions on dental advertising were overbroad and must be
invalidated.
This analysis demonstrates that the general framework of the Canadian
commercial speech analysis is quite similar to that used by U.S. courts. While the
Canadian Supreme Court's decisions may be somewhat less protective of
commercial speech in comparison to the U.S. Supreme Court, it has shown itself
willing to strike down measures that it deems to be unjustified or overbroad
infringements on the right to freedom of commercial expression.
B. TOBACCO ADVERTISING
In the 1995 case RJR-MacDonald, Inc. v. Canada, the Supreme Court of Canada
applied its commercial speech jurisprudence to tobacco advertising for the first
time. The law at issue, the Tobacco Products Control Act, included a broad ban on
tobacco advertising and promotion (with some exceptions), and it required tobacco
packaging to include health warnings.
While all Justices agreed that tobacco advertising fell within the purview of
Section 2(b), the Court split five-to-four on whether the regulations survived the
Central Hudson-like review under Section 1.89 In a decision similar in many respects
so Id. at 46 (stating that the Canadian Supreme Court "took as a matter of faith that the Charter
was not confined to the protection of political expression" and applied Oakes to all forms of
expression).
81 See Rocket v. Royal Coll. of Dental Surgeons of Ont., [199012 S.C.R. 232, 246-47 (Can.).
82 Id.
" Id. at 247.
84 Id.
8 See id. at 251.
86 See Gower, supra note 77, at 56 (writing that the Canadian Supreme Court "is cognizant of the
importance of commercial expression to consumers' economic decision-making and does its part to
protect commercial expression on the basis of its role in a free marketplace").
8 RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Att'y Gen.), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 (Can.).
88 See id. at 200.
89 See id. at 204.
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to Lorillard (which postdated it), the Court held that the ban on advertising was
rationally connected to the government's interest in reducing tobacco use (parallel to
the Prong 3 analysis under Central Hudson).90 However, the Court then concluded
that the advertising ban was overbroad (similar to the Prong 4 analysis that doomed
the restriction in Lorillard).9 1 As in Lorillard, the Court focused on the interest of
consumers in obtaining information relevant to their decisions, writing that "the
advertising ban deprives those who lawfully choose to smoke of information relating
to price, quality, and even health risks associated with different brands." 92 The court
also invalidated the requirement for health warnings on cigarette packages, because
the government had not shown that it would have been less effective to require
warnings that were attributed to the government.9 3
Rather than abandon its efforts to restrict tobacco advertising, the government
responded by adopting new tobacco control measures intended to address the
Court's concerns. The Tobacco Act of 1997 maintained the broad prohibition on
tobacco advertising but created a new exception for "information advertising or
brand preference advertising," so long as such advertising was primarily directed
towards adults. 94 "Information advertising" was defined to mean advertising about a
product's availability and/or price, while "brand-preference advertising" was defined
as advertising about a product's brand characteristics. 95 The law explicitly prohibited
"lifestyle advertising," defined as "advertising that associates a product with . . . a
way of life such as one that includes glamour, recreation, excitement, vitality risk or
daring." 96 In short, tobacco companies could advertise only the "cold, hard, facts"
about their products-and only to adult consumers. 97 Additionally, tobacco
companies were barred from advertising in any way that was "false, misleading or
deceptive or . . . likely to create an erroneous impression about the characteristics,
health effects or health hazards of the tobacco product or its emissions." 98
Separately, the Parliament also reissued the regulations governing health warnings
on tobacco packaging, increasing the size of the warnings from thirty-three percent
to fifty percent of the package space, and clearly attributing the warnings to Health
Canada (Canada's Ministry of Health). 99
The tobacco companies challenged the revised laws as violating their rights to
freedom of expression. In Canada v. JTI-MacDonald Corp. (2007), the Canadian
Supreme Court upheld all of the challenged provisions in a unanimous decision.00
As in RJR-MacDonald, the Court agreed that tobacco advertising fell within Section
2(b) of the Charter. I0' The analysis focused almost entirely on whether the
90 See id. at 206.
9' See id. at 207.
92 Id. at 347 (emphasis added).
9 See id. at 349.
94 Tobacco Act, S.C. 1997, c. 13, § 22(2). Such advertising was permitted only if directly mailed
to adults, in publications with eighty-five percentor more adult readership, or in places youth were not
permitted to go. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., CANADA'S FIRST (TWO-YEAR) IMPLEMENTATION REPORT:
ANNEX 1: MISCELLANEOUS 42 (2007) (Can.), available at http://www.who.int/fctc/reporting/Canada
annex miscellaneous.pdf.
95 See Tobacco Act § 22(4).
96 Id.
9 See id. § 22.
9 See id. § 20.
99 Canada (Att'y Gen.) v. JTI-MacDonald Corp., [2007] 2 S.C.R. 610, para. 7 (Can.).
100 Id. at para. 141.
'0 See id. at para. 72.
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challenged provisions were saved by the operation of Section 1. The Court applied
the Oakes test as follows:
* Substantial Governmental Concern: The Court quickly determined
that the interest at stake-"protecting the health of Canadians and
responding to a national health problem"-was one of fundamental
importance.102
* Rational Connection: The Court noted the incredible amount of new
evidence that had emerged between 1995 and 2007 confirming the
addictiveness of tobacco, demonstrating the harm caused by smoking,
and linking tobacco advertisements to initiation and increased use.' 03 It
also recognized-as U.S. courts often fail to do' 04 -that the "factual
context of a long history of misleading and deceptive advertising by the
tobacco industry" suggests a strong need to closely constrain the
industry's actions. 05
* Minimal Impairment: As usual, this was the main point of
contention.106 This section of the analysis was the point at which the
differences between the law challenged in RJR-MacDonald and the
revised version of the Tobacco Act were crucial. The Court wrote that the
law protected the ability of tobacco companies to communicate
information to current smokers, while prohibiting "lifestyle advertising"
that "invariably seeks to increase overall tobacco consumption, not just to
inform existing smokers." 107 This addressed Parliament's legitimate
interest in reducing tobacco use while still protecting the right of
consumers to obtain relevant information.
* Proportionality Between Effects and Objective: This is the balancing
part of the Oakes test that has no direct corollary in the Central Hudson
test. In this case, this additional section of the test was central to the
analysis because it provided the Court with the opportunity to underscore
the importance of the specific context. It wrote that the harms addressed
by the legislation were real and pressing ("nothing less than a matter of
life or death for millions of people"),os whereas "[w]hen commercial
expression is used, as alleged here, for the purposes of inducing people to
engage in harmful and addictive behaviour, its value becomes
tenuous." 09 In other words, not all commercial speech is created equal.
When commercial speech is used in a way that directly threatens the
health of a large segment of the population, the Parliament may act with
a freer hand.'' 0
With regard to the larger warning labels, the Court conducted a separate Oakes
test analysis. It found both a sufficiently important governmental concern and a
"mass of evidence" supporting the rational connection between the means used and
102 Id. at para. 38.
o3 See id. at paras. 9-10.
104 In Lorillard, for example, neither the majority opinion nor the dissent included any reference
to the industry's history of misconduct. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
105 JTI-MacDonald Corp., 2 S.C.R. at para. 61.
106 See id at para. 100.
'
07 Id. at para. 102.
08 Id. at para. 68.
109 Id. at para. 47.
10 Id.
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the government's objectives.' Notably, it used the tobacco industry's objection to
the larger warnings as evidence of the warnings' likely effectiveness.112 Turning to
the issue of "minimal impairment," the Court simply stated, "[T]he evidence
established that bigger warnings may have a greater effect. Parliament is not
required to implement less effective alternatives."" 3 Finally, the Court looked to the
experience of other countries for additional support, citing both the World Health
Organization's Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC)114 and the fact
that other countries including "Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Finland, Singapore,
and Brazil" required warnings that cover at least fifty percent of the package. 115
(After the JTI-MacDonald decision, Parliament passed a new law increasing the size
of the required warning labels to seventy-five percent of the package surface."' 6 This
new requirement is currently being challenged in court." 7)
Thus, in its two cases on tobacco advertising, the Canadian Supreme Court has
shown that it will defer broadly, but not blindly, to the Parliament. Although it is
hesitant to second-guess Parliament's policy judgments, it is also unwilling to accept
blanket prohibitions on commercial speech, even in the context of tobacco. It is wary
of restrictions on "information advertising," but is more willing to accept restrictions
on "lifestyle advertising" that do not communicate any substance of value." 8
IV. A COMPARATIVE DISCUSSION: THE BALANCE BETWEEN
COMMERCIAL SPEECH AND PUBLIC HEALTH
As the preceding conversation demonstrates, the First Amendment-and the
U.S. commercial speech doctrine, more specifically-is not unique. Other countries,
including our neighbor to the north, provide constitutional protection for commercial
speech and must consider how to balance the interest in free expression against other
key societal interests." 9 In Canada, the Oakes test used is quite similar, at least in its
language and structure, to the Central Hudson test. Both tests require an examination
of the government interest involved, the extent to which the proposed restriction
promotes the government's interest, and whether the government's approach is
appropriately tailored to the problem at hand.120
The case of tobacco marketing, where the commercial speech at issue promotes
the sale of a deadly product, provides a window through which to view how different
legal systems balance the competing interests involved. Even though the text of the
Oakes test closely mirrors the Central Hudson test, U.S. and Canadian courts apply
the two tests differently. One way to look at these differing results is to point to the
11 Id. at para. 135.
12 Id. at para. 136.
"
3 Id. at para. 137.
114 Canada and most other nations in the world are parties to the FCTC, but the United States is
not. Parties to the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, WHO FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL, http://www.who.int/fetc/signatories-parties/en/index.html (last
updated Dec. 7, 2012). The FCTC states that parties should adopt warning labels that cover at least
fifty percent of product packaging. WORLD HEALTH ORG., WHO FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON
TOBACCO CONTROL 10 (2005).
115 Canada (Att'y Gen.) v. JTI-MacDonald Corp., [2007] 2 S.C.R. 610, para. 138 (Can.).
116 See Sarah Schmidt, Government Asks Court to Toss out Challenge over Cigarette Pack
Warnings, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Nov. 21, 2012, http://www.ottawacitizen.com/health/
story.html?id=7586355.
"' See id.
"
8 See JTI-MacDonald Corp., 2 S.C.R. at paras. 28, 121.
119 See, e.g., id.
120 See id. at paras. 36-37 (Oakes test).
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differences in history, culture, and legal practices between the two countries.
Another more realist view is to point to differences in the political backgrounds and
affiliations of the justices. But looking through a comparative lens is insightful on
another level-it helps to unpack some of the values and interests that underlie First
Amendment doctrine, or perhaps that have gone missing from more recent
developments in U.S. commercial speech doctrine. Examining U.S. commercial
speech doctrine in light of the Canadian Supreme Court's tobacco-related decisions
suggests several ways in which the U.S. Supreme Court's approach could be
reconsidered or reconceptualized.
The comparison is illustrative starting from the origins of commercial speech
doctrine in both countries. Both legal systems originally focused on the need to
protect and promote the autonomy of consumers. The opinions in Virginia Pharmacy
and Ford v. Quebec each emphasized that the primary interest in need of protection
was that of the consumer/listener, not the speaker.121 If the focus is kept on the
consumer, it follows that speech that does not serve the interest in consumer
autonomy may be more easily limited.122 A company's desire to promote its product
in a particular way, for example, is not as highly protected as the consumer's interest
in getting truthful information about a given product. As Justice La Forest wrote in
RJR-MacDonald, "when the form of expression placed in jeopardy falls farther from
the 'centre core of the spirit' [of promoting consumer autonomy and self-
development], this Court has ruled restrictions on such expression less difficult to
justify."l 23 The main underlying value, then, of the commercial speech doctrine was
protecting the consumer from government restrictions.
It is unclear from the U.S. Supreme Court cases whether protecting the
consumer meant (1) protecting consumers' autonomy to make their own decisions,
or (2) protecting consumers more generally, including protecting consumers' other
interests (including their interest in health). In Virginia Pharmacy, these two
interests went together. The information at issue (prescription drug prices) was
needed to empower informed decision-making, but it was also urgently needed on a
much more practical level by consumers who were ill and in need of relief'124 The
Supreme Court emphasized the importance of both of these interests in Virginia
Pharmacy, 125 but in later cases the focus shifted almost entirely to protecting
consumer autonomy (and protecting consumers from governmental
121 See id. at para. 34 ("When the Charter was adopted, the question arose of whether the free
expression guarantee extended to commercial expression by corporations. This Court ruled that it did .
. . . The Court premised this conclusion on an examination of the values protected by the free
expression guarantee: individual self-fulfilment, truth seeking and democratic participation . . . . It
noted that commercial speech may be useful in giving consumers information about products and
providing a basis for consumer purchasing decisions . .. .").
122 When the focus is kept on the interest in promoting consumer autonomy, it also follows that
commercial speech targeting children may be more easily restricted than commercial speech directed
towards adults. This is the approach that Canada's Supreme Court has taken. See, e.g., id. at para. 94
(noting that "the vulnerability of the young may justify measures that privilege them over adults in
matters of free expression"); Irwin Toy, Ltd. v. Quebec (Att'y Gen.), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 (Can.)(upholding Quebec's restrictions on marketing directed at children under the age of thirteen).
123 RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Att'y Gen.), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199, 281 (Can.) (La Forest, J.,
dissenting).
124 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 763-64 (1976)
("When drug prices vary as strikingly as they do, information as to who is charging what becomes
more than a convenience. It could mean the alleviation of physical pain or the enjoyment of basic
necessities.").
25 Id. at 763-65.
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"paternalism" 26). In the Canadian cases by contrast, the Canadian Supreme Court
has remained interested in protecting both interests. 127 It is concerned about
protecting consumer autonomy, but equally concerned about protecting consumers
from harm.128
This dual concern is demonstrated by the Canadian Supreme Court's decisions
in the two tobacco-related cases. First, in RJR-MacDonald, it invalidated the total
ban on tobacco advertising because it extended to "advertising which arguably
produces benefits to the consumer while having little or no conceivable impact on
consumption."' 2 9 The court hypothesized that a complete ban on advertising could
apply even to "purely informational advertising" that allowed consumers to
"compare brand content with an aim to reducing the risk to their health." 3 o Such
information could help inform consumer decision-making and improve health, and
thus restricting such advertising was inconsistent with the purposes of the
commercial speech doctrine.' ' Although the Court was willing to approve broad
restrictions on tobacco advertising, it was not willing to permit advertising
restrictions so broad that they might restrict advertisements that were informative
and helpful to consumers.
This formed the basis of the distinction between "informational" and "lifestyle"
advertising that the Canadian Supreme Court further developed in JT1-
MacDonald. 132 In this later case, the Court recognized that not all advertising
communicates information. 133 A key advertising tactic, pioneered in part by tobacco
companies but employed by a variety of industries, is to create positive associations
with a product without communicating any information.' 34 In the case of cigarettes,
such "lifestyle" promotions attract youth to tobacco smoking without providing any
useful information to current smokers.' 35 Accordingly, the Court upheld a broad ban
on "lifestyle" advertising, while protecting the ability of tobacco companies to
communicate "information advertising."' 3 6 By allowing the dissemination of the
"cold, hard facts" about tobacco products while prohibiting advertising intended to
increase consumption, the Court balanced the potentially competing values
underlying the commercial speech doctrine. It permitted consumers to obtain all
potentially relevant information, while also protecting the public from harm by
restricting non-informational advertising that could increase tobacco use. A key
factor in its decision was its recognition of the unique dangers of tobacco.' 3 7 Because
126 See, e.g., 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996) (writing that restrictions
on truthful commercial speech "usually rest solely on the offensive assumption that the public will
respond 'irrationally' to the truth" (quoting Linmark Assocs. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97 (1977))).
127 See, e.g., RJR-MacDonald Inc., 3 S.C.R. at 343.
12 See id
12 Id.
13o Id.
131 See id.
132 Canada (Att'y Gen.) v. JTI-MacDonald Corp., [2007] 2 S.C.R. 610, paras. 96-116 (Can.).
1" Id. at para. 102.
131 Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of
Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1445 (1999).
35 Indeed, the tobacco industry was largely built on a foundation of this type of image-only
advertising: "Cleverly targeted ad campaigns, such as the now-famous Marlboro Man, succeeded in
creating demand for Marlboros and other cigarettes by conveying to smokers a sense of independence,
autonomy, and sexuality. Not surprisingly, consumers soon associated cigarettes with desirable,
abstract traits of the sort that they almost certainly would not have perceived absent effective
advertising." See id. at 1471 (detailing the tobacco industry's history of misleading advertisements).
'
3 6 JTI-MacDonald Corp., 2 S.C.R. at paras. 96-116.
1' See id. at para. 9.
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the government's interest was so weighty ("nothing less than a matter of life or death
for millions of people"),138 the Court granted Parliament more leeway to develop an
appropriate response.
How have the U.S. courts furthered these values underlying the commercial
speech doctrine? How have they sought to balance consumer autonomy with other
consumer interests? As mentioned above, the commercial speech doctrine in the
United States started out by emphasizing the interests of consumers. Since that time,
however, the focus of the courts has gradually shifted from the consumer to the
speaker. The Lorillard decision was a somewhat intermediary step, as the Court
emphasized the need to ensure both "the speaker's ability to propose a commercial
transaction" as well as the "adult listener's opportunity to obtain information."l39 In
the years since, the focus has continued to shift towards the commercial speakers.
For example, both the trial court and the appellate court that reviewed the FDA's
proposed cigarette warning labels quickly dismissed the public's interest in
obtaining the information presented by the labels. 40 The courts focused instead on
the tobacco companies' right to avoid disseminating a message to which they
objected. 141
Very few U.S. cases (and policymakers) have explored the possibility that
measures allowing consumers of harmful products to receive only the "cold, hard
facts" may be more likely to survive scrutiny than blanket advertising restrictions.
One notable exception is a 2009 Fourth Circuit decision (WV Association of Club
Owners and Fraternal Services v. Musgrave) upholding West Virginia's strict limits
on advertising for video lottery machines. 142 The Court's conclusion that the law
survived the fourth prong of Central Hudson was based in part on the ability of
retailers to display a uniform sign stating "West Virginia Lottery Products available
here."1 43 The Fourth Circuit wrote that allowing only this type of informational
advertising "achieves the state's goal of balance: it informs consumers that lottery
products are available, but it does not prey on vulnerable populations."144 Although
it is an outlier, the Musgrave decision suggests how U.S. courts could give more
consideration to the informational value of speech being restricted. This might lead
to more flexibility in cases that involve "pure" marketing devoid of informational
content.
With respect to consumer interests such as health, U.S. courts have failed to
clarify how the non-informational interests of consumers might be factored into the
Central Hudson balancing test. It is no longer clear in U.S. case law whether cases
involving cigarettes (which are inherently deadly) should be treated differently from
products involving pharmaceuticals (which are potentially life-saving). Some U.S.
courts have gone so far as to suggest that protecting consumers from the harms of
I3 See id. at para. 68.
"' Lorillard v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 529 (2001) (emphasis added).
10 To the extent Judge Leon discussed this issue, he asserted that warnings were "crafted to
evoke a strong emotional response" and not to inform consumers. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v.
FDA, 845 F. Supp. 2d 266, 272 (D.D.C. 2012).
141 See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (concluding by
quoting Sorrell's admonition that because the government "finds expression too persuasive does not
permit it to quiet the speech or to burden its messengers" (quoting Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S.
Ct. 2653, 2670 (2011))).
142 WV Ass'n of Club Owners & Fraternal Servs. v. Musgrave, 553 F.3d 292 (4th Cir. 2009).
143 See id. at 307.
144 Id.
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tobacco products may not even be a substantial governmental interest for purposes
of First Amendment analysis.145
Why is it that the commercial speech doctrine in the United States has strayed
so far from its consumer protection origins? As Tamara Piety recently wrote, the
commercial speech doctrine, "which was justified on the basis of protection for
consumers," has gradually transformed into a doctrine that "protect[s] speakers'
interests, even where such speech [is] at the consumers' expense."' 46 One possible
explanation, which Piety suggests, is that these developments are in line with the
Supreme Court's expanding doctrine of "corporate personhood," as reflected in the
Citizens United decision. 147 The Supreme Court has increasingly made less of a
distinction between the First Amendment interests of natural persons and the
interests of corporations. 148
Another reason may be the U.S. courts' concern with government paternalism (a
concern that shows up far less in the legal decisions of other countries 49). Courts
may be concerned that allowing the government to focus on the consumers' interests
may put the government in the position of inappropriately deciding what is "best"
for consumers.'50 This concern seems somewhat beside the point when dealing with
a product that incontestably causes illness and premature death. But even if
conceding the validity of the concern about paternalism (even in the case of
tobacco), it does not explain why U.S. courts do not focus commercial speech
protection on informational communication as Canada does.
V. CONCLUSION
Using a comparative lens and focusing attention on Canada provides an
opportunity to step back and contemplate the direction of recent U.S. commercial
speech cases-and to consider the various roads not taken. For instance, what is it
about "lifestyle advertising" -- devoid of the any information that would be useful to
a consumer-that merits the "heightened scrutiny" suggested in Sorrell? In what
way does such "lifestyle advertising," particularly for deadly products, serve the
interests of consumers? The Canadian experience helps to highlight the distinction
between different types of advertising appeals and leads to questions about why such
distinctions are absent from U.S. case law.
More broadly, analyzing the experience of Canada brings more attention to the
values that underlie-or could underlie-the commercial speech doctrine. In both
14s R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 696 F.3d at 1219 n.13 ("[W]e are skeptical that the government
can assert a substantial interest in discouraging consumers from purchasing a lawful product, even one
that has been conclusively linked to adverse health consequences."); see also Nat'l Ass'n of Tobacco
Outlets, Inc. v. City of Worcester, 851 F. Supp. 2d 311, 316 (D. Mass. 2012) ("[Plaintiffs] contend
that the City has no legitimate interest in prohibiting non-misleading advertising to adults to prevent
them from making decisions of which the City disapproves. I agree.").
146 Tamara R. Piety, "A Necessary Cost of Freedom?" The Incoherence of Sorrell v. IMS, 64
ALA. L. REV. 1, 6 (2012).
147 See id. at 5.
148 On the one hand, Citizens United focused on the political realm-an area in which First
Amendment rights are more strictly protected-so the holding may not easily translate over to the
commercial realm. See generally Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). On
the other hand, if the "corporate personhood" element of Citizens United is emphasized, it is unclear
why corporations should be treated less as "persons" in the commercial, as opposed to the political,
realm.
149 SHINER, supra note 56, at 114.
Iso This concern was also evident in the Virginia Pharmacy decision. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy
v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976).
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the United States and Canada, the commercial speech doctrine was created to protect
the interests of consumers. In the United States, the courts have never clarified
exactly what consumer interests the doctrine is intended to protect, and in recent
years the courts have shifted their attention away from consumers altogether.
Refocusing on the values underlying the doctrine may help to suggest new ways of
reconciling the constitutional protection of free speech with the need to address the
death and disease caused by tobacco use.
